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Abstract
Internationalization o¤ers enhanced opportunities for individuals to place savings
abroad and evade domestic saving taxation. This paper asks whether the concomi-
tant loss of saving taxation necessarily is harmful. To this end we construct a model
of many symmetric countries in which public goods are nanced by taxes on saving
and investment. There is international cross-ownership of rms, and countries are
assumed to be unable to tax away pure prots. Countries then face an incentive
to impose a rather high investment tax also borne by foreigners. In this setting,
the loss of the saving tax instrument on account of international tax evasion may
prevent the overall saving-investment tax wedge from becoming too high, and hence
may be benecial for moderate preferences for public goods. A world with high-
spendinggovernments, in contrast, is made worse o¤ by the loss of saving taxes,
and hence stands to gain from international cooperation to restore saving taxation.
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1 Introduction
Capital income taxes are generally applied to saving as well as investment. The distinction
between saving and investment taxation is immaterial in a (stylized) closed economy, but
not in an open economy. Internationally, taxes on saving generally apply to worldwide
savings, while investment taxes in principle a¤ect only local investment. Most coun-
tries apply both saving and investment taxes, and thus have tax systems that combine
residence-based and source-based taxation. Over time, however, countries have found it
increasingly di¢ cult to enforce residence-based taxes on saving, as international nan-
cial integration o¤ers ample opportunities to avoid such taxation. Continued erosion of
residence-based taxation would imply that in the end only source-based capital income
taxes remain.
Should we mourn the possible loss of residence-based capital income taxes? Judging
from long-standing national and international policy initiatives in this area, we should.
Individually and collectively, countries seem to try very hard to repair residence-based
capital income taxes. Requirements of banks to report domestic interest payments, for
instance, and bilateral commitments to exchange interest payment information all aim
to enable the taxation of savings. Multilaterally, discussions at the OECD and in the
EU serve the same purpose. The EU introduced a proposal for a common minimum
withholding tax on interest already in 1989, followed by a proposal for an exclusive choice
between withholding taxation and information exchange in 1998.1 More recently, the EU
Council of Economics and Finance Ministers reached a political agreement on a saving
tax directive with an emphasis on the international exchange of information in January
2003 (see below).
This paper evaluates the welfare consequences of a loss of the saving tax instrument,
and of its mirror-image of resurrecting the saving tax instrument through international
cooperation. Cooperation is assumed to go only so far as to enable each country to impose
1For analyses of withholding taxes and information exchange as a means to secure the taxation of
international interest ows, see Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) and Keen and Ligthart (2002).
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a saving tax. This is the essence of the international cooperation in the form of exchange
of information to be implemented in the EU. Tax rates thus are set non-cooperatively
regardless of whether the saving tax is available. In this setting, we show that the loss
of the saving tax paradoxically may improve welfare. The reason is that international
share ownership may lead to a saving-investment tax wedge, i.e. the wedge between the
required return to investment and the net return to saving, that is too high in the non-
cooperative equilibrium with saving taxation. This reects that the investment tax is
set too high in an e¤ort to tax the foreign owners of domestic rms. The loss of the
saving tax instrument will then reduce the overall saving-investment tax wedge and may
in fact bring it closer to the saving-investment tax wedge that arises with full international
cooperation (also in the area of tax rates). In this scenario, international cooperation to
restore saving taxation may reduce welfare and hence would be perverse. This would
be the case with low-spendinggovernments with moderate tastes for public goods. In
contrast, for high-spendinggovernments with strong preferences for public goods the
restoration of the saving tax instrument would increase welfare.
These ambiguous welfare consequences reect several conicting international exter-
nalities associated with especially national investment tax policies. First, a higher invest-
ment tax has a direct, negative impact on foreign welfare to the extent that the investment
tax is borne by foreign shareholders. This we term a tax exporting externality. Second, a
higher investment tax gives rise to higher foreign saving exactly because foreign after-tax
prot income is foreseen to decline. Higher foreign saving raises revenues abroad from
saving taxation. This second saving externality is clearly a positive externality (as long
as the saving tax abroad is positive). Finally, a third externality may arise, as the higher
investment tax at home tends to lower the world interest rate. On the one hand, this
stimulates foreign investment, adding to foreign investment tax revenues; on the other, it
reduces foreign saving, decreasing saving tax revenues. With both investment and saving
taxes present abroad, in general this third tax base externality has an ambiguous net e¤ect
on foreign welfare.
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Notice that the second and third externalities will be more important, the higher is the
need for tax revenues to nance public goods provision (and therefore the higher are in-
vestment and saving tax rates). Hence, for low preferences for public goods saving and in-
vestment taxes are low enough for the rst externality to dominate, so that capital income
taxation with both investment and saving taxes produces too high a saving-investment
tax wedge. Under these circumstances, losing the latter instrument may improve welfare.
Contrary to this, for high preferences for public goods the rst externality will be domi-
nated by the second and third externalities. Indeed, in that case the combined externality
on other countries from a higher tax wedge in one country will be positive, so that the
saving-investment tax wedge with both tax instruments will be too low relative to a fully
coordinated tax policy. Accordingly, losing the saving tax will make matters worse and
reduce welfare.
Important for our argument for an ambiguous welfare e¤ect of restoring saving tax-
ation is foreign ownership of capital in any given country. As seen in Table 1 in the
Appendix, average foreign ownership of assets relative to GDP in the EU for both non-
traded assets (in the form of direct investments) and for traded assets (in the form of
portfolio investments) is already quite extensive at 14 and 16 percent, respectively. In
our stylized model, governments only raise taxes to nance public expenditures. More
generally, of course, governments may require high capital income tax revenues to nance
a high level of redistribution. A group of countries thus may equally benet from the
restoration of the saving tax in defense of the welfare state.
As indicated, e¤orts to shore up the taxation of savings in the EU go back to 1989.
Only recently, however, has there been substantive progress in this area. In November
2000, the Council of Economics and Finance ministers agreed in principle that the EU
should adopt a generalized system of international exchange of information on interest
payments by the year 2010. Until then, Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg would be
free to levy a minimum withholding tax instead. In January 2003, the Council reached
political agreement on a savings directive as part of a larger Tax Packageand committed
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itself to formally adopt the Package before the European Council in March 2003. In the
end, the Package was adopted in June 2003. The proposed savings directive makes the
international exchange of information the standard of cooperation, even though three EU
member states (Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg) are allowed to impose non-resident
interest withholding taxes instead (at a rate of 15 percent from January 1, 2005, to be
raised to 20 percent on January 1, 2008, and to 35 percent on January 1, 2011).2
What has caused the recent drive in the EU towards enhanced cooperation to restore
the taxation of savings? Over the last two and a half decades, two relevant trends can
be identied. First, capital markets have become more deeply integrated leading to a
higher degree of international capital mobility. The key reasons for this are that national
authorities have discarded with capital controls, and that information technology has
advanced greatly. As a result, evading saving taxes by placing funds abroad now is easier
than ever. Second, many European countries seemingly have expanded their total public
outlays in this period. As evidence of this, the average total tax burden in EU (total tax
intake relative to GDP) has increased from 34 pct. in 1975 to more than 41 pct. in 2000,
as can be seen in Table 2 in the Appendix.3 This development suggests that the need to
secure revenue from also saving taxation has been on the rise. The overall increase in the
size of government may well reect that countries have become richer in the meantime
(presuming an income elasticity of government expenditures/transfers in excess of unity)
2Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria will subsequently implement automatic exchange of information,
if and when the EU enters into an agreement with Switzerland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco
and Andorra to exchange information, and if and when the United States similarly commits itself
to exchange information. At the time of this writing (April 2004), the Commission has presented a
draft agreement only with Switzerland that will only sign after satisfactory results in the other bilat-
eral negotiations have been achieved. For more information on the Tax Package and related Commis-
sion activities, see Commissioner Bolkesteins Speech/04/136 and the press release IP/03/787 under
http://europa.eu.int/taxation_customs.
3The table demonstrates that the overall increase reects di¤erent trends for di¤erent EU countries.
Some countries had a steadily increasing tax burden during the period; for other countries the expansion
of the public sector seems to have stopped in the mid-1980s; nally, for some countries may be no clear
trend in the overall tax burden.
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and perhaps that in some countries governments with more of a socialist inclination have
been in o¢ ce.
Several authors have previously examined the optimal capital income taxation in a
small open economy, without evaluating the welfare consequences of the loss of a particular
tax instrument. Gordon (1986), Frenkel et al. (1991) and others show that a small
economy optimally does not levy a source-based investment tax, if a full tax instrument
set, including unlimited prot and labor taxes, is available. Source-based investment
taxes, however, are generally optimally applied in the absence of a prot tax. Huizinga
and Nielsen (1997) in particular examine how the optimal saving and investment tax
mix depends on the feasibility of prot taxation, and on the extent of foreign ownership
of domestic rms. Investment and prot taxes are relatively advantageous with foreign
ownership, and may even serve to nance negative saving taxes (so as to transfer resources
to domestic residents).
Several contributions have also examined the need for international coordination of
capital income taxes.4 Razin and Sadka (1991) consider a model, in which labor and
capital are inputs into a production function with constant returns to scale. In this
setting, two countries have no reason to coordinate either saving or investment taxes,
if they take the world interest rate as given. Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) consider
labor, saving and investment taxes in a similar model, but let the world interest rate be
endogenous. They show that countries then equally have no need to coordinate co-existing
saving and investment taxes. Huizinga and Nielsen (2002) extend this work to include
prot taxation and foreign ownership in a model with many symmetric countries. With
incomplete prot taxation and some foreign ownership, there generally exists a need to
coordinate the saving-investment tax wedge upwards or downwards, depending on the
availability of tax instruments and the strength of government preferences for public
goods. The present paper instead assumes throughout that countries do not coordinate
their tax rates, and then considers whether welfare is higher with or without an e¤ective
4See also OECD (1991), the Ruding Report (1992), and Keen (1993).
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saving tax instrument.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 considers optimal tax policy from the
perspective of a single small open economy. This is done for the case where investment
and saving taxes are both operative, and also for the case where only an investment tax
is available. Section 3 examines the optimal tax policy for a similar closed economy that
imposes a single tax wedge between the gross return to investment and the net return to
saving. Optimal tax policy in the closed economy corresponds to the fully coordinated
tax policy in the world of small open economies. Section 4 contains the three possible
pairwise comparisons of tax wedges across the three tax regimes dealt with in sections 2
and 3. These tax wedge comparisons are a prerequisite for the welfare comparison between
the two noncooperative regimes with and without the saving tax in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 Tax policy in the small open economy
This section examines the optimal capital income tax policy from the perspective of a
small open economy. After outlining the basic model, we in turn consider the cases where
saving and investment taxes are both available, and where only investment taxes are
available.
2.1 The basic model
The basic model corresponds to Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) with the exceptions that the
present model takes the supply of public goods to be endogenous, while there is no prot
taxation nor any possibility of government lump sum transfers to domestic residents.5
The small open economy is one of many identical economies in the world economy. The
economy exists for two periods, and takes the world interest rate, r, as given. Each
5Introducing a less than full prot tax will not alter any of our qualitative conclusions.
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countrys representative agent receives an endowment, Y , of a single good in the rst
period. This endowment is allocated between rst period consumption, C1, and saving,
S. In the rst period, rms make investments, K, that are only productive in the second
period. In the second period, households spend their net-of-tax return from saving and
prot income to consume C2.
Consumers also enjoy a public good, G, provided by the government in the second
period. To nance this public good, the government can impose a saving tax at the
rate u, and an investment tax at the rate v, both payable in the second period. There
are pure prots from production, because there is some factor of production, e.g. land or
entrepreneurial services, in inelastic supply, or alternatively there are decreasing returns to
scale regarding capital investments. As stated above, we assume that these prots cannot
be taxed. There are no restrictions on the sizes or signs of the saving and investment
taxes, u and v. Finally, we assume that the representative rm and thus its prot stream
are in part foreign-owned. In particular, a share   0 of each countrys rms is owned
by foreigners. Conversely, domestic citizens own a total share of  of foreign rms.
Firms produce an output F (K) in the second period, where the production function
F is assumed to be strictly concave. Firmsafter-tax prots are [F (K)  (1 + r + v)K],
where 1+ r+ v is the user cost of capital. Prot maximization on the part of rms yields
the following optimal investment rule,
F 0(K) = 1 + r + v (2.1)
Households in turn face the following two-period budget constraint,
C2 = (Y   C1)(1 + r   u) + (1  )[F (K)  (1 + r + v)K]
+[F (K)  (1 + r + v)K] (2.2)
where stars denote foreign variables.6
6Note that prots earned abroad accruing to domestic residents are neither taxed abroad nor at home.
Again, partial taxation of prots would not a¤ect our qualitative results. Further note that full symmetry
in the world economy entails that  = .
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Consumers derive utility from private consumption in both periods and from the pub-
lic good, G. Lifetime utility is assumed to be additively separable, and is written as
U(C1; C2) + V (G). The rst order condition regarding the private consumption choice is
as follows,
U1 = U2(1 + r   u) (2.3)
The budget constraint of the government stipulates that overall tax revenues equal
the provision of the public good, G, as follows,
0 < G = uS + vK (2.4)
Tax policy is set so as to maximize the utility of the representative agent. Formally,
the government faces the problem of choosing tax rates u and v plus public good provision
G so as to maximize the following Lagrangean expression,
L = U(C1; (Y   C1)(1 + r   u) + (1  )[F (K)  (1 + r + v)K]+ (2.5)
[F (K)  (1 + r + v)K]) + V (G) + (uS + vK  G)
The maximization is carried out respecting constraints (2.1) and (2.3);  is a Lagrange
multiplier associated with the government budget constraint (2.4). The rst order condi-
tions regarding the tax rates u and v and the volume of public goods G can be stated as
follows,
 U2 + (1  ueu) = 0 (2.6)
 U2(1  ) + [1 + (1  )up  evv] = 0 (2.7)
V 0(G)   = 0 (2.8)
where ev =  (dK=dr)=K is the semi-elasticity of investment with respect to the invest-
ment tax v, eu =  (dS=du)=S is the uncompensated semi-elasticity of saving with respect
to the saving tax u, and p denotes the propensity to consume in the rst period out of
second period income. It can be seen that ecu = eu + p > 0 is the compensated semi-
elasticity of saving with respect to the saving tax, u. The uncompensated semi-elasticity
eu will also be taken to be positive in what follows.
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The rst order conditions (2.6)-(2.8) characterize tax policy in the cases where both
capital tax instruments are available, or where the saving tax is not part of the instrument
set (in which case (2.6) is not relevant). Absent cooperation, a world of small countries
is engaged in a non-cooperative policy game; more precisely, we can dene the non-
cooperative capital income tax equilibrium in the world of small economies as follows:
Non-cooperative tax equilibrium: A Nash equilibrium of the capital income tax
game is a series of tax rates ui; vi for each single country that maximizes welfare in country
i given tax rates in all other countries (u i; v i).
With all countries symmetric, we focus on the symmetric non-cooperative tax equilib-
rium. Next, we briey discuss the optimal tax policy for the two cases with and without
saving taxation on the assumption of a positive cross-ownership of rms, i.e. a positive
. In section 5, we indicate how the discussion changes if there is no foreign ownership,
 = 0.
2.2 All tax instruments available
From conditions (2.6)-(2.8), the optimal saving tax, u, can be seen to be either positive
or negative, while the investment tax, v, is always non-negative. The exact sizes of the
capital income taxes depend on the desired level of public goods. Three separate cases,
increasing in the desired level of public goods provision, can be distinguished. In case i),
the demand for public goods is so weak that the investment tax, acting as a substitute
prot tax, is used to nance both public goods provision and a saving subsidy, while
the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF), measured as   =U2, is below unity. In a
borderline case ii), the saving tax rate, u, is just equal to zero, and the MCPF equals unity,
while the investment tax rate is at its national income maximizing value of v = =ev. In
case iii), nally, both saving and investment taxes are positive with the MCPF exceeding
one.
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2.3 Only investment taxation
Absent the saving tax, optimal tax policy is found from equations (2.7) and (2.8) with u
set equal to zero in (2.7). The investment tax, v, can be written as v = [1  (1 )=]=ev.
This expression for v is positive, as the investment tax is the only avenue to nance public
goods provision.
3 Tax policy in the closed economy
In this section, we consider the optimal capital income tax policy in a closed economy.
The closed economy is taken to be identical to the single small open economy considered
before. Obviously, savings and investment in the closed economy have to be equal, i.e.
S = K. The closed economys tax policy is of interest, as it corresponds to the cooperative
tax policy in a world of many identical small open economies. This section therefore sets
the stage for the subsequent welfare evaluation of di¤erent non-cooperative tax regimes in
sections 4 and 5.7 In the closed economy, the tax authority has a single tax instrument, x,
to introduce a wedge between the gross return to investment and the net return to saving.
The tax x can be thought to be levied on investment, so that the net return to saving
and the market rate of interest are r, while r + x is the required return to investment.
Prot maximization on the part of rms now yields the following investment rule,
F 0(K) = 1 + r + x (3.1)
The budget constraints for private agents and the government are rewritten as,
C2 = (Y   C1)(1 + r) + [F (K)  (1 + r + x)K] (3.2)
7By focusing on symmetric countries, we concentrate on average externalities among countries in non-
cooperative tax policy equilibria. The implications of asymmetry for tax competition have been studied
by Bucovetsky (1991). Tax coordination can also be asymmetric in that only part of the countries in the
world participate. See, for instance, Mendoza (2002) for a discussion of European tax harmonization in
a larger world.
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0 < G = xK (3.3)
Again, the government chooses tax policy and public goods provision, i.e. x and G,
so as to maximize the utility of the representative agent, respecting equations (3.1)-(3.3).
The optimality conditions with respect to x and G are as follows,8
 U2 + (1  xes) = 0 (3.4)
V 0(G)   = 0 (3.5)
In these expressions, es   (dS=dx)=S is the semi-elasticity of saving with respect to
the single tax wedge, x, accounting for any endogenous change in the interest rate. The
semi-elasticity es can be expressed as follows,
es =  p  dr
dx
(eu + p) (3.6)
At the same time, the saving-investment balance implies that dr=dx can be found as,
dr
dx
=
es   ev
ev
(3.7)
so that es can be written as,
es =
eveu
ev + p+ eu
(3.8)
The optimality condition (3.4) takes into account that, unlike in the small open econ-
omy, the capital income tax, x, a¤ects the interest rate, r. The change in the interest
rate independently a¤ects economic behavior and also overall capital income tax revenues.
Condition (3.4) also di¤ers from the rst order condition for the investment tax in the
small open economy (2.7) in that in the closed economy the incidence of the investment
tax is entirely on own residents.
8It can easily be checked that the rst order condition with respect to a tax on saving rather than
investment is identical to (3.4).
11
4 Tax wedges in non-cooperative and cooperative regimes
So far, we have described tax policies for di¤erent instrument sets in the small open
economy, and in the closed economy. The two regimes with and without the saving
tax in the small open economy, the saving-tax (s) and the no-saving-tax (ns) regimes,
are non-cooperative regimes in that tax rates are set non-cooperatively. Contrary to
this, tax policy in the closed economy corresponds to a cooperative regime (c) with fully
coordinated tax policies across the worlds economies. These three tax regimes are all fully
characterized by the obtained saving-investment tax wedge (and the resulting revenue
subsequently spent on public goods).
Our main interest in this paper is to compare the obtained welfare levels in the two
non-cooperative tax regimes for the small open economy, with and without the saving
tax. This is done in Section 5. To see how such a welfare comparison can be made,
suppose that both the s and ns regimes yield saving-investment tax wedges above the
cooperative tax wedge in the c regime. The ns regime is then preferred to the s regime,
if the tax wedge in the ns regime is smaller than in the s regime and thereby closer to
the cooperative tax wedge, i.e. if xc < xns < xs. As another example, if the tax wedges
in the two non-cooperative regimes are both smaller than the cooperative tax wedge and
xc > xs > xns, then the saving-tax regime is preferred.
Hence, a welfare comparison across non-cooperative tax regimes requires that we rst
rank tax wedges across all three regimes; consequently, we carry out three pairwise tax
wedge comparisons: (i) between the s and c regimes; (ii) between the ns and c regimes;
and (iii) between the s and ns regimes.
Non-cooperation with a saving tax vs. cooperation, s vs. c
By denition, starting from the non-cooperative tax equilibrium in the s regime a
unilateral increase in either the saving or the investment tax will be perceived by the
country in question to have no impact on national welfare. Nonetheless, a common
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increase in the saving-investment tax wedge in all countries generally will have a non-zero
impact on each countrys welfare. If an across-the-board tax wedge increase raises national
welfare, then we can conclude that the tax wedge in the non-cooperative equilibrium was
too low, and vice versa.
What are the underlying reasons that non-cooperative tax policy may not be optimal
from the worlds perspective? Three di¤erent externalities of national income tax policy
can in fact be identied. To illustrate these, let us consider the impact on a domestic
economy, if all other countries increase their investment tax in unison. An expression for
this welfare e¤ect, denoted dW=dv, is found by direct di¤erentiation of the Lagrangean
in (2.5) as follows,
dW
dv
=  U2K + upK + dW
dr
dr
dv
(4.1)
The three terms on the right hand side of (4.1) correspond to the three externalities that
can be distinguished. The rst externality, a tax exporting externality, simply reects that
with cross-ownership higher foreign investment taxes directly reduce domestic after-tax
prot income. This is obviously a negative externality. The second externality, a saving
externality, arises as higher foreign investment taxes engender higher domestic saving
exactly because domestic after-tax prot income (to be received in the second period) is
lower. The higher domestic savings are taxed domestically at a rate u, adding to domestic
saving tax revenues. This second externality thus is positive (if u is positive). Finally,
a third externality generally arises, as higher foreign investment taxes tend to lower the
world interest rate. This stimulates domestic investment (adding to domestic investment
tax revenues), but reduces domestic saving (lowering domestic saving tax revenues). With
investment and saving taxes present, this third tax base externality in general has an
ambiguous net e¤ect on domestic welfare.
To learn the net e¤ect of these various externalities in the saving-tax regime, we
employ eq. (3.4) to see how a common tax wedge increase a¤ects national welfare levels.
Specically, a common increase in the (investment) tax rate lowers utility from private
goods by U2K, and it raises utility from public goods by (1   xes)K. Taken together,
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we nd that (dW=dx)=K =  U2 + (1   xes). In this expression, U2; ; x;K and es are
all evaluated at the non-cooperative tax wedge. To see whether (dW=dx)=K is positive
or negative, we can arbitrarily assume that the increase in the overall tax wedge from the
non-cooperative level comes about through a higher investment tax. This allows us to
retrieve the following expression for U2 from (2.7),
U2 = 
1 + (1  )up  evv
1  
which enables us to write the net gain from a higher investment tax as
(dW=dx)=K = [ 1 + (1  )up  evv
1   + 1  xes]
From (2.6) and (2.7) and the equality x = u + v, we can next derive the following
expressions for u and v as functions of x,
u =
evx  
ev + ecu(1  )
; v =
ecu(1  )x+ 
ev + ecu(1  )
Also using the formula for es in (3.8), we now can obtain after some manipulation,
(dW=dx)=K =
eu
(ev + ecu)(ev + e
c
u(1  ))
[ (ev + ecu) + evecux] (4.2)
With positive cross-ownership of rms (i.e.  > 0), it is easily seen that the overall
tax wedge increase from the non-cooperative level is welfare-enhancing if,9
x >
1
ecu
+
1
ev
(4.3)
Thus, if the non-cooperative tax wedge in the saving-tax regime already exceeds the right-
hand-side of (4.3), then a further increase in the tax wedge is welfare-enhancing, and vice
versa. These are also the conditions for the non-cooperative tax wedge in the saving-tax
regime to be less than the cooperative tax wedge, and vice versa. We state this sections
main nding as
RESULT 1. If the saving-investment tax wedge in the non-cooperative regime with both
saving and investment taxes available exceeds 1=ecu + 1=ev, then raising it in all countries
9We deal with the case of  = 0 in subsection 5.1 below.
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will enhance welfare. If the opposite inequality holds, lowering the wedge will be welfare-
improving.
Result 1 indicates that the combined negative externalities (the tax exporting exter-
nality and the saving part of the tax base externality) dominate for low values of the
saving-investment tax wedge - and hence low or moderate preferences for public goods.
Conversely, the positive externalities (the saving externality and the investment part of
the tax base externality) dominate for high values of the tax wedge and thus strong pref-
erences for public goods. This is intuitive, as the second externality above is stronger, the
larger is the tax wedge and, in particular, the tax on saving (viz. the variable u in the
second term in (4.1)).
Non-cooperation without a saving tax vs. cooperation, ns vs. c
Next, we compare the tax wedges and welfare levels in the non-cooperative no-saving-
tax regime and the cooperative regime. We proceed in a manner completely parallel
to above. An increase in the investment tax in all countries by one unit in the non-
cooperative regime again entails a loss of utility from private goods of U2K and a gain in
utility from public goods of (1 xes)K. From the rst order condition (2.7) with u = 0,
we can now express U2 as,
U2 = 
1  evv
1  
Noting also that v = x in the absence of saving taxation, we can nally express the welfare
gain from the uniform international investment tax increase as,
(dW=dx)=K =

(ev + ecu)(1  )
[ (ev + ecu) + evx(ev + p+ eu)] (4.4)
Thus, a joint increase in investment taxes will raise welfare in all countries if,
x >
(ev + e
c
u)
ev(ev + p+ eu)
(4.5)
For later use, we state this as Result 2,
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RESULT 2. An increase in the saving-investment tax wedge from the non-cooperative
tax equilibrium in the no-saving-tax regime is welfare-enhancing, i¤ the wedge exceeds
(ev + e
c
u)=[ev(ev + p+ eu)].
The intuition for this result is as follows. For weak demand for public goods, the
investment tax will be small. An increase in the tax abroad will then lower welfare in the
country under consideration, because its residents partly bear the burden of the tax. This
negative externality cannot be o¤set by the positive externality associated with a lower
interest rate worldwide and hence higher investment and investment tax revenues at home,
exactly because the investment tax is only small. Hence, for weak preferences for public
goods, the non-cooperative tax wedge exceeds the cooperative one. For strong enough
preferences for public goods, however, the investment tax is high enough for the net spill-
over of an even higher investment tax to be positive. In this instance, the cooperative tax
wedge exceeds the non-cooperative one.
Non-cooperation with a saving tax vs. non-cooperation without a saving tax, s vs. ns
The last tax wedge comparison involves the two non-cooperative capital tax regimes.
Specically, we ask when the saving-investment tax wedge in the saving-tax regime exceeds
the tax wedge in the no-saving-tax regime. Equivalently, we could ask when the loss of
the saving tax leads to a reduction in the saving-investment tax wedge. The answer to
these questions is straightforward.
To start, if preferences for public goods happen to lead countries to select a positive
investment tax equal to =ev and a zero saving tax in the saving-tax regime, then the loss
of the saving tax is inconsequential. If preferences for public goods are somewhat stronger,
each country in the saving-tax regime selects an investment tax greater than =ev along
with a positive saving tax, resulting in a total saving-investment tax wedge above =ev.
In this case, the loss of the saving tax naturally leads to a rise in the investment tax as
the remaining capital tax instrument, but not enough to fully reestablish the tax wedge in
the saving-tax regime, since the perceived marginal cost of public funds rises. The overall
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tax wedge thus is reduced following the loss of the saving tax instrument Conversely, if
the no-saving-tax regime entails an investment tax lower than =ev coupled with a saving
subsidy (a negative saving tax), then the elimination of the saving tax will only partly
be o¤set by a drop in the investment tax so that the overall saving-investment wedge
increases. We summarize this discussion as follows,
RESULT 3. The saving-investment tax wedge in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium
with both saving and investment taxes will exceed the wedge in the non-cooperative tax
equilibrium without saving taxation i¤ x > =ev.
5 When is the loss of saving taxes welfare-enhancing?
We are now ready to examine when the loss of the saving tax instrument actually increases
welfare in a setting of non-cooperative capital income taxation. This is the case, if the
saving-investment tax wedge under non-cooperative taxation in the no-saving-tax regime
better approximates the cooperative tax wedge than the wedge under non-cooperative
taxation in the saving-tax regime.
In our discussion, we maintain that tax wedges of di¤erent sizes can come about - in
the same tax regime - as a result of a varying strength of preferences for public goods.
Straightforwardly, stronger preferences for public goods give rise to a larger tax wedge and
a higher supply of public goods in any particular tax regime. This section then attempts
to isolate for what preferences for public goods the loss of the saving tax instrument
actually is welfare-improving. Regarding the strength of the demand for public goods, we
can generally distinguish four di¤erent scenarios referring to Results 1 to 3 of the previous
section.
First, preferences for public goods can be very weak so that in the non-cooperative
saving-tax regime the saving tax in fact is non-positive. In this case, we have xc < xs 
xns, i.e. the tax wedge in the saving-tax regime is greater than in the cooperative tax
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wedge regime, but smaller than in the no-saving-tax regime. In the borderline case where
the saving tax actually equals zero, we have xns = xs. Obviously, the no-saving-tax regime
cannot be preferred to the saving-tax regime in this case.
Second, there can be very strong preferences for public goods so that the tax wedge
in the non-cooperative saving-tax regime is not greater than under cooperation. This
means that xs  1=ecu + 1=ev. In addition, it follows that xs > =ev, so that we obtain
the ranking xns < xs  xc. The non-cooperative tax wedge in the no-saving-tax regime
is again farthest from the cooperative one, implying that also in this second case the
saving-tax regime is preferred to the no-saving-tax regime.
The third case has moderate preferences for public goods, entailing that in the saving-
tax regime the saving tax will be positive, but not much greater than zero. At the same
time, this case is characterized by the non-cooperative tax wedge in the no-saving-tax
regime being greater than or equal to the cooperative tax wedge. This implies that the
inequality =ev < xns  (ev+ecu)=[ev(ev+p+eu)] denes the third case. Now we obtain
from Results 1 to 3 that xc  xns < xs, so that the non-cooperative tax regime without
saving taxation is bound to produce higher welfare than the non-cooperative regime with
both capital income taxes present.
The fourth and nal case lies between the third and the second cases, in that pref-
erences for public goods generally are stronger than in the former case, yet weaker than
in the latter. The inequality between tax wedges in the fourth case is xns < xc < xs
so that it is di¢ cult to conclude which of the two non-cooperative tax regimes produces
higher welfare. Somewhat imprecisely, we can invoke a continuity of the tax wedge in the
strength of preferences for public goods, and state that if preferences for public goods are
close to the range in the third case above, the non-cooperative tax equilibrium without
saving taxation should still be the preferred one. Conversely, if preferences for public
goods are almost as strong as required in the second case above, then maintaining saving
taxation is preferred.
To be more precise, we can write preferences for public goods as H(G), so that the
18
parameter  functions as an indicator of the strength of preferences for these goods. Then
we can vary  systematically from 0 to 1. One possibility then is that we start out in
the rst regime and then successively move into the third, the fourth, and nally the
second regime described above. Depending on functional forms and in particular how
the various semi-elasticities vary with tax rates, the picture could be more complicated
than this in that the latter three regimes could be encountered more than once, as 
progresses. However, the saving-investment tax wedge perceived to maximize revenue in
the non-cooperative regime with saving taxation will always lie in the second regime,10
and the same therefore goes for some neighborhood around it (in particular to the left of
it). In addition, there will always be a neighborhood of tax wedges to the right of =ev
(where the saving tax part is only slightly bigger than zero) belonging to the third regime.
To conclude, the message from this discussion is that losing saving taxes will not
lower welfare, if they are positive but close enough to zero. We state this insight as a
Proposition:
PROPOSITION. If preferences for public goods are moderate, such that the non-cooperative
equilibrium with both saving and investment taxation has a positive, but small saving
tax, then the loss of saving taxation will be welfare-enhancing. Conversely, if preferences
for public goods are either weaker, so that the non-cooperative equilibrium with both
capital income taxes has a saving subsidy, or stronger, so that the saving tax will be high,
then the loss of the saving tax will lower welfare.
To reiterate, it is the temptation on the part of governments to capture prots other-
wise accruing to foreigners that leads to overtaxation of capital income in the saving-tax
regime, provided that preferences for public goods are not too strong. The elimination of
the saving tax then reduces this excess taxation, and thus can be welfare-enhancing.
10It is easily seen that the revenue maximizing tax wedge xs is given by 1=eu +1=ev + p(1 )=(euev)
and satises (4.3).
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5.1 Alternative assumptions regarding foreign ownership and
prot taxation
Our analysis so far has been carried out under the assumptions that there is some cross-
ownership of rms and no prot tax. For completeness, we briey consider the additional
cases where either all rms in every country are fully domestically owned, or complete
prot taxation is possible.
With full domestic ownership, there are no cross-country prot ows. Non-cooperative
capital income tax policy in the saving-tax regime then corresponds to the coordinated
policy stance (and to tax policy in the parallel closed economy).11 Hence, there is no scope
for policy coordination, and losing the saving tax is therefore bound to lower welfare. This
insight is supported by equation (4.2) which provides the welfare e¤ect of moving the
capital income tax policy away from the non-cooperative equilibrium policy with both
capital income tax instruments available. If  = 0 is inserted into (4.2), a marginal
tax change has zero welfare consequences so that indeed there is no scope for policy
coordination. To see this, note that with no cross-ownership of rms the rst two of
the three externalities reected in (4.1) immediately vanish. The same turns out to hold
for the third one, since the associated positive (negative) spillovers on foreign investment
(saving) tax bases exactly o¤set.12
Next, we consider the possibility of prot taxation. It can be seen that introducing
a partial taxation of prots, i.e. a prot tax of less than 100 percent, will not a¤ect
any of our results. An incomplete prot tax combined with foreign ownership of rms
preserves cross-border prot ows, and the operation of the tax exportation, saving, and
tax base externalities remain as exposited in section 4. Only a complete prot tax of 100
percent, that puts an end to cross-border prot ows, will change the picture. Indeed,
11This is proved in Prop. 2 in Huizinga and Nielsen (2002).
12Without foreign rm ownership, the setting is essentially the same as in the paper by Bucovetsky
and Wilson (1991). These authors, as mentioned in the introduction, nd no scope for capital income
tax coordination when both saving and investment taxes are available.
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with complete prot taxation the investment tax will not be used, and only saving taxes
remain, if feasible. Losing the saving tax can only be harmful in such circumstances.13
5.2 Discussion
The main result of this paper is that, paradoxically, losing the saving tax instrument in
the international economy may improve welfare and, vice versa, restoring a lost saving
taxation could lower welfare. The key reasons for this result are a non-cooperative set-
ting of taxes in individual countries, some foreign ownership of rms, and an incomplete
taxation of pure prots. Given the considerable e¤orts that the European Commission
and, to some extent, individual Member States have put into the saving taxation area, it
would be nice if on the basis of the analysis in this paper we could rmly conclude whether
these e¤orts are laudable or ill-guided. It seems to us, however, that we should contend
ourselves more modestly with pointing out the possible paradox and with suggesting that
the issue be further analysed in future work.
The reasons for this are two-fold. First, within our framework it is not easy to deter-
mine exactly which of the possible cases applies to EU countries at the moment. Second,
in order to make a stronger judgement, a number of additional and complicating factors
would have to be taken into account.
As to the rst point, we have identied a possibly welfare-enhancing loss of saving
taxation in case of moderate preferences for public goods. More precisely, this occurs for
a range of preferences for public goods corresponding to a saving-investment tax wedge
in the no-saving-tax regime, xns, greater than or equal to =ev, but at the same time
not much greater than (ev + ecu)=(ev + p+ eu). In principle, one could compute actual
saving-investment tax wedges in EU countries, interprete them as optimal choices given
that saving taxation is not entirely feasible at present, and then compare them to the
above range. However, since the magnitudes of the saving and investment semi-elasticities
13That coordination is not needed under complete prot taxation is also established in Prop. 2 of
Huizinga and Nielsen (2002).
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are not known and the foreign ownership share is only imperfectly estimated, any rm
conclusion as to whether the restoration of saving taxation is preferable seems precluded.
Our second reason for withholding a rm judgement on the desirability of restoring
savings taxation in the EU has to do with the fact that our model o¤ers only a rst step
towards modeling the issue. In fact, we have opted for a two-period model and we have
suppressed taxes other than on capital income to bring out the underlying ambiguity in
the simplest possible way. A full examination of the issue will have to be of a quantitative
nature, and therefore a fully-edged computable dynamic equilibrium model along the
lines of Mendoza and Tesar (2003) or Klein et al. (2003) would be a welcome extension
of the present paper. Once foreign ownership of rms plus pure prots are introduced in
multi-country versions of such models, it may be possible to shed more light on whether
we should expect a loss of residence-based capital income taxes to lower welfare or not.
In a more realistic setting, labor income and consumption taxation would be allowed
for. These taxes would probably take the brunt of the burden of nancing government
expenditures, alleviating the pressure on capital income taxes in our model. Exactly
how high personal capital and corporate income taxes would be set hinges crucially on
whether the government can commit to its policy choice and for how long. In our two-
period model, we have assumed full commitment powers on the part of governments, but
in a multi-period setting the time consistency issue must be addressed head-on.
6 Conclusions
At present, most countries de jure levy residence-based personal capital income taxes
as well as source-based corporate income (and withholding) taxes. The former fall on
saving, while the latter fall on investment and supranormal prots. Residence-based
capital income taxes, however, are increasingly di¢ cult to enforce, as international capital
markets become more integrated. The evasion of residence-based capital income taxes
potentially leads to the e¤ective disappearance of the taxation of saving.
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The central Proposition of this paper indicates that such an elimination paradoxically
may improve welfare, as it may bring the saving-investment tax wedge emerging from
non-cooperative tax policy closer to the optimal tax wedge that arises under full coordi-
nation. This will occur if preferences for public goods are relatively weak. The result also
presupposes the existence of cross-border prot ows as brought about by foreign owner-
ship of rms and limitations on the taxation of pure prots. At the very least, the loss of
saving taxation could well be considerably less harmful than often perceived. Translated
into the language used in tax reform debates, a transition from the present combination
of personal capital income taxation and corporate income taxation (with deduction of
interest on debt) to, say, a comprehensive business income tax (CBIT), where capital
income is solely taxed at the level of the rm and without deduction of interest on debt,
might not be such a bad thing after all.14 In this respect, one can note that preferences
for public goods, at least at the level of public administrations, are not etched in stone.
Hence, it is possible that preference drift towards higher preferences for public goods
can explain an increased willingness at the international level to contemplate e¤ective
cooperation to recover the taxation of savings.
Analogous to the discussion of this paper, it is feasible to consider the loss of the
investment tax instrument rather than the savings tax instrument. In fact, several schol-
ars, among them Mintz and Tulkens (1996), have advocated an international switch to
exclusively residence-based capital income taxes. Using the techniques of this paper, it
is possible to show that the elimination of investment taxes can improve welfare, if pref-
erences for public goods are rather weak. In this instance, investment taxes are used
primarily to redistribute income internationally rather than to nance public goods. In-
ternational income redistribution through investment taxation, however, distorts capital
investment, and hence is best eliminated. On the other hand, if preferences for public
goods are strong, then eliminating investment taxation is bound to reduce welfare.
14For a discussion of the CBIT proposal and competing ways of taxing capital income in the open
economy, see U.S. Department of the Treasury (1992) and Cnossen (1996).
23
Appendix
Table 1. Direct and portfolio investment liabilities as shares of GDP in the EU, 1998.
Country Direct inv. liabilities Portfolio inv. liabilities
Austria 0.13 0.07
Belgium-Lux. 0.77 0.08
Germany 0.04 0.09
Denmark 0.17 0.12
Spain 0.22 0.13
Finland 0.15 0.63
France 0.16 0.20
United Kingdom 0.24 0.49
Italy 0.09 0.06
Netherland 0.36 0.62
Portugal 0.20 0.18
Sweden 0.24 0.42
EU-average 0.14 0.16
Sources: International Financial Statistics (Balance of Payments), World Bank.
Note: The entries show the stocks of investment liabilities relative to GDP. The data for
Germany and Netherlands are for 1997.
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Table 2. Total tax revenue as percentage of GDP in the EU, 1975-2000.
Country 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Austria 37.5 39.8 41.9 40.5 41.6 43.3
Belgium 40.2 42.4 45.6 43.2 44.6 45.7
Denmark 40.0 44.0 47.4 47.1 49.4 49.5
Finland 36.6 36.1 39.6 44.6 45.1 47.3
France 35.9 40.6 43.8 43.0 44.0 45.2
Germany 32.6 34.6 34.3 32.9 38.2 37.7
Greece 21.8 24.2 28.6 29.3 32.4 37.6
Ireland 29.1 31.4 35.1 33.5 32.8 31.2
Italy 26.1 30.4 34.4 38.9 41.2 41.9
Luxembourg 37.5 40.8 45.1 40.8 42.4 40.4
Netherlands 41.6 43.6 42.6 43.0 42.0 41.1
Portugal 20.8 24.1 26.6 29.2 32.5 34.3
Spain 18.8 23.1 27.8 33.2 32.8 35.2
Sweden 41.0 46.1 47.0 51.9 48.5 54.0
UK 35.3 35.2 37.7 36.8 34.8 37.3
EU-15 33.0 35.8 38.5 39.2 40.1 41.5
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics.
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